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John N. Williams Confucius, Mencius, and the notion of true succes- 
sion 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the kinds of issues that interest historians of ideas, in particular Confu- 
cian scholars, is a relation that is sometimes called "true succession." Some 
examples of this relation are clear-cut, others less so. Plato was certainly a true 
successor of Socrates, but one is more hesitant to say that Aristotle was a true 
successor of Plato. The relation has some interesting features. Nietzsche prob- 
ably had no true successor and Wittgenstein was not his own true successor. 
Although Marx was a true successor of Hegel and Lenin was a true successor of 
Marx, Lenin was not a true successor of Hegel. Zeno was a true successor of 
Pythagoras, but so too was Parmenides. 
Correspondingly, we can raise a host of issues about intellectual successors, 
such as the question of whether Christ had any true successor or whether 
Mencius or Hsiin Tzu or either were true successors of Confucius. The classical 
tradition had it that Mencius was not a true successor of Confucius, whereas the 
Neo-Confucian tradition holds that he was. 
In this article I will argue for the classical interpretation. My strategy will be 
to focus on the broad question of what true succession is and then relate this to 
the comparatively narrow question of whether Mencius was a true successor of 
Confucius. The tacit analysis of "true succession" in the literature needs both 
addenda and corrigenda. The correct and complete analysis of true succession 
proves fatal to the orthodox arguments that Mencius was a true successor of 
Confucius. Second, even were this important fact overlooked, the strongest 
traditional textual evidence for the claim that Mencius was a true successor of 
Confucius is insufficient to establish it. Third, new textual and logical con- 
siderations support the claim that Confucius held that virtue is not innate in 
Man. Given that it is noncontroversial that Mencius held the central doctrine 
that virtue is innate, the weight of evidence is that Mencius was not a true 
successor of Confucius. This leaves open the possibility that there are more 
plausible true successors of Confucius-notably Hsiin Tzu. 
II. THE NATURE OF TRUE SUCCESSION 
Although the notion of a true successor appears, in one form or another, in 
discussions of the relationship of Mencius and Confucius,' there has yet to be 
an attempt to give an explicit account of true succession. However, there are 
remarks made here and there in the literature from which an account, albeit 
implicit, can be reconstructed. Philip Ho Hwang suggests that Mencius may 
have been mistakenly believed to be a true successor of Confucius because 
Mencius himself believed this. And he believed this because "he [Mencius] 
really believed that his ideas were in complete harmony with those of 
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Confucius"2 (my emphasis). Likewise Whalen Lai supports the view that 
Mencius was a true successor of Confucius because "he remained faithful to 
Confucius,"3 and similarly D. C. Lau takes the orthodox view because "... 
what he did was to offer his own theory which is not only consistent with, but 
can furnish a firm basis to, Confucian thought."4 This suggests that as a neces- 
sary condition for B to be a true successor of A, the ideas of A and B are 
consistent; that is, the conjunction of the ideas of both A and B is not a 
self-contradiction. It should be clear that this view is almost correct. But first, it 
is not quite correct. Lenin is a paradigm example of the intellectual successor of 
Marx, but although there is consistency between the central ideas, for example, 
concerning economics, the class system, and revolution, there are differences. 
There is, for example, an inconsistency between the ideas peripheral to the 
theses of each thinker. For example, Lenin's position on the necessity of 
a transitional dictatorship after the revolution is inconsistent with that of 
Marx.5 Martin Lu, who is more explicitly interested in "true succession," 
comments: 
A genuine successor-master relationship does not necessarily imply that their 
ideas and doctrines must be identical or even similar in the minutest details.6 
This is undoubtedly correct, but too weak. If the central ideas of A and B 
were in fact identical we would say that at worst one was guilty of plagiarism 
and that at best, by a rare coincidence, independent minds had arrived at the 
same view. This would clearly rule out true succession, since an integral idea in 
succession is that, in some sense, the successor is influenced by the predecessor. 
For this reason history declines to offer a verdict upon whether plagiarism or 
coincidence is the explanation of the identical production of the infinitesimal 
calculus by Newton and Leibniz,7 but no one would say that either was the 
intellectual successor of the other. This condition, therefore, needs to be 
strengthened to the observation that a genuine successor-master relationship 
does necessarily imply that their central ideas are not identical. It is important 
to notice that the condition is, once again, only a condition upon the central 
ideas of predecessor and successor. For one thing, there may be similar claims 
to be found in different thinkers which play only a peripheral role in the corpus 
of ideas of the works which contain them. A limited similarity can even be 
found between works that express central theses that are inconsistent with each 
other. For example, the passages in chapter 3 of the Chung Yung and the 
Analects, "Never do to others what you would not like them to do,"8 are 
similar to each other but likewise similar9 to Christ's injunction in the Sermon 
on the Mount, "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do 
to you, do ye even so to them,"10 but no one would say that the world view of 
the Bible is consistent with that of the Analects or the Chung Yung, let alone 
that Christ was a true successor of Confucius. 
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A parallel amendment needs to be made by a further important condition 
suggested by the same writer: 
Few people would deny that Plato was a true successor of Socrates in spite 
of the former's elaboration of and advancement over the latter's ideas.1 (My 
emphasis) 
But it is at least plausible to suggest that Plato could not have been a true 
successor of Socrates unless his ideas were an advancement of those of So- 
crates. Perhaps the clearest way to put this is that if B is the true successor of 
A then, ceteris paribus, A would have written more or less what B in fact did 
write. An alternative formulation is to say that if A had lived and been aware of 
the central ideas of B, A would more or less have agreed with them. Both 
formulations are subjunctive conditionals, a fact which will shortly become 
important. 
The analysis of true succession is not quite complete, however, since we have 
already observed that temporal succession is a necessary condition of intellec- 
tual succession. Quite trivially, if B is the true successor of A then the central 
ideas of B are developed after those of A. 
This gives us the necessary and sufficient conditions of true succession, 
namely: 
1. B is a true successor of A if and only if 
(a) The central ideas of B were developed after those of A. 
(b) The central ideas of A are consistent with those of B. 
(c) B understood the ideas of A. 
(d) A would, ceteris paribus, have developed more or less the same central 
ideas as those actually developed by B. 
(e) The central ideas of A are not identical with those of B. 
The analysis explains the strange features of true succession. For example, 
the late Wittgenstein of the Investigations12 is certainly no true successor of the 
early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus,13 the former work being successfully writ- 
ten in explicit repudiation14 of the latter. Although the relationship between 
the early and late Wittgenstein satisfies conditions (a), (e), and probably (c), 
since Wittgenstein was probably in the best position to understand his earlier 
work, condition (b) is violated. Notably, Wittgenstein at the time of the Inves- 
tigations could not consistently have held on to a tractarian theory of language. 
It might be objected at this point that condition (d) counts in favor of Wittgen- 
stein being his own true successor. But this is an acceptable conclusion. While 
condition (d) is satisfied on the grounds that Wittgenstein would have de- 
veloped his later ideas if he did develop them, it is not sufficient to establish 
Wittgenstein being his own successor, although indeed it counts towards it. If 
the ideas of the later Wittgenstein had been a simple witting amendment or 
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development of the earlier Wittgenstein rather than a repudiation, then surely 
we would admit Wittgenstein as his own true successor. 
A further objection might be that (b) is not a necessary condition of true 
succession because it follows that no thinker can have a true successor if his 
ideas are themselves internally inconsistent. But again, this conclusion is not 
unwelcome. For one thing, an original theory that contains a central contra- 
diction is in agreement with any other theory whatever and therefore with 
no specific theory in particular, since anything and everything follows from a 
contradiction. It follows that the serious task of deciding between two putative 
successors will hinge upon how the contradiction in the original theory is to be 
resolved. For example, the contradictions which I will argue are to be found in 
the Analects can be resolved either in a way that increases the plausibility of 
Mencius, or in a way that increases that of Hsiin Tzu, as a true successor of 
Confucius. 
The correct analysis can now be brought to bear on the question of whether 
Mencius was a true successor of Confucius. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR MENCIUS AS A TRUE SUCCESSOR 
I will now apply the analysis of true succession to a strong and popular argu- 
ment that Mencius was a true successor of Confucius. The argument ostensibly 
hinges on whether the Ta Hsueh and the Chung Yung are reliable expressions 
of the ideas of Confucius. The assumption which underpins this argument is 
that if it is established that they are, then given that Mencius was a true succes- 
sor of the author of these two works, it ipso facto follows that Mencius was a 
true successor of Confucius. But this line of argument faces three objections. 
First, a supporter of this argument faces an empirical difficulty because in 
order to establish what Confucius' central ideas actually were by means of an 
appeal to the Ta Hsieh and.the Chung Yung, he needs to establish whose ideas 
are expressed there. It is difficult to establish this in the case of the Ta Hsueh, 
since, as is well recognized,15 the authorship of this work is obscure. 
Second, he also needs to establish if the author of both works, whoever he or 
she was, was a true successor of Confucius. It is important to note that he would 
still need to do this even if he had already conclusively demonstrated that the 
author of these two works was Confucius himself. In other words, even if 
we had conclusively established that the ideas of the Ta Hsueh and the Chung 
Yung were those of Confucius, we have already noted that this would not ipso 
facto establish that the Confucius of this period was a true successor of the 
Confucius of the Analects. For as I have already shown, a thinker may not be 
the true successor of himself. 
But third, it is the underpinning assumption which is the more important 
move in the argument-more important indeed than the question of the 
reliability of the two works. The assumption is made recently by Lu, who 
comments: 
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In the main argument which follows, I shall present the thesis that the Con- 
fucian orthodoxy as outlined in the Ta Hsiieh and the Chung Yung could 
justifiably be traced back to Confucius and that as Mencius' theory of human 
nature is a further explanation of this orthodoxy he was without doubt a true 
successor of Confucius.16 (My emphasis) 
But this assumption is false. The argument is invalid, because true succession is 
not a transitive relation. In other words, the principle to which such an argu- 
ment appeals, namely, that 
1. If C is the true successor of B and B is the true successor of A, then C is the 
true successor of A 
is false. The principle is false for four reasons. No relation is likely to be 
transitive if the necessary conditions for it to obtain are that some further 
relation obtains which is itself not transitive. But (b), (c), and (e) refer to the 
relations of consistency, understanding, and nonidentity, none of which are 
transitive. Worse still, (d) refers to the satisfaction of a subjunctive conditional, 
and subjunctive conditionals, unlike their indicative counterparts, are notori- 
ously nontransitive. I will now take these relations in order. 
It is false to claim that 
2. If p is consistent with q and q is consistent with r, then p is consistent with r. 
The thesis "A & B" is consistent with the thesis "B & C," which is in turn 
consistent with the thesis "- A & B & C," but the thesis "A & B" is not 
consistent with the thesis "- A & B & C." To make this schema of an example 
more concrete, suppose for the sake of argument that Confucius' essential view 
is that Man is innately good and that harmony will result from the rectification 
of names. Further suppose that Mencius' view is that harmony will result from 
the rectification of names and that all people are basically equal, and that Hsiin 
Tzu's view is that Man is innately evil, that harmony will result from the 
rectification of names, and that all people are basically equal. Were all of this 
the case, then Confucius' view would be consistent with that of Mencius, and 
Mencius' view consistent with that of Hsiin Tzu, but Confucius' view would not 
be consistent with that of Hsiin Tzu. 
It is false to claim that 
3. If A understands the central ideas of B and B understands the central ideas 
of C, then A understands the central ideas of C. 
For one thing, the ideas of C may be expressed in such a way as to preclude A, 
but not B, from understanding them, whereas the ideas of B are perspicuous to 
A. For another, even if the ideas of all three are consistent with each other, the 
class of ideas central to C may include, but not exhaust, those of B, and likewise 
with respect to B and A, so that there are new, possibly fresh, ideas central to C 
that A does not, or even cannot, understand. For example, it is plausible that 
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Lenin understood the central ideas of Marx, who in turn understood the central 
ideas of Hegel, but implausible to suppose that Lenin understood the central 
ideas of Hegel.17 
Furthermore and quite noncontroversially,18 it is false to claim that 
4. If A : B andB # C, then A # C. 
It is true both that the Prime Minister of Britain is not the President of the 
U.S.A. and that the President of the U.S.A. is not Margaret Thatcher, but 
false that the Prime Minister of Britain is not Margaret Thatcher. 
Finally, subjunctive conditionals differ interestingly from conditionals in 
general, in that they are not transitive.19 A demonstration of the nontransitivity 
of subjunctive conditionals is afforded by the invalidity of the following argu- 
ment: 
5. If there were dead bodies in every department of the National University of 
Singapore then there would be dead bodies in the Pathology Department of 
the National University of Singapore. 
6. If there were dead bodies in the Pathology Department of the National 
University of Singapore then no one would feel disgusted. 
7. .'. If there were dead bodies in every department in the National University 
of Singapore then no one would feel disgusted. 
Yet it is conceivable that (5) and (6) and are both true while (7) is false. 
This granted, we cannot validly argue from the fact that Confucius would, 
ceteris paribus, have written more or less what the author(s) of the Ta Hsueh 
and the Chung Yung wrote and that these author(s) would, ceteris paribus, 
have written more or less what Mencius wrote, to the conclusion that Confucius 
would, ceteris paribus, have written more or less what Mencius wrote. 
IV. TEXTUAL EVIDENCE FOR THE ORTHODOX VIEW OF MENCIUS AS TRUE SUCCESSOR 
OF CONFUCIUS 
I shall now consider the strongest textual arguments for the claim that Mencius 
was a true successor of Confucius. I will take it as noncontroversial that Men- 
cius' central view of human nature is that virtue is innate in Man. From the 
discussion of true succession it follows that if Confucius' real view was not that 
virtue is innate or that virtue is not innate then the weight of evidence is not that 
Mencius was a true successor of Confucius or that Mencius was not a true 
successor of Confucius. I will not here discuss other plausible violations of 
condition (b), for example, that for Confucius, but not Mencius, a justified 
revolution against the ruling authority is impossible. 
A. Lau's Argument for the Orthodox View 
D. C. Lau argues that both Confucius and Mencius, but not Hsiin Tzu, hold the 
view that virtue is innate, as follows: 
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Both Confucius and Mencius repeatedly use the phrase "delighting in the 
Way." Once more this emphasizes the naturalness of morality. Delight and joy 
are usually experienced when a man pursues a natural activity unimpeded. On 
this point one can see that Hsiin Tzu is not in the true tradition of Confucius, as 
he looks upon morality as artificial and therefore unnatural.20 
But a number of criticisms can be made of this argument. 
Even if we accept Lau's conclusion that Confucius held that morality is 
natural for Man, we have not thereby accepted the conclusion that Confucius 
held that morality is innate in Man, which is surely the crucial claim. Not 
everything that is natural is innate. It is natural for babies to learn things about 
the world after they are born, but although there is no contradiction in saying 
that the ability to learn is innate, it is a contradiction to say either that learning 
itself is innate or that the knowledge acquired as the result of learning is innate, 
in both cases because it is logically impossible to learn something that one 
already knows. 
Moreover, it is far from obvious that one who delights in the Way (Tao) is 
thereby either naturally or innately moral. One interpretation of how Con- 
fucius sees "the Way" is that "The Way (Tao) is the moral law or moral order. 
It is the Way of Heaven, [this latter being] no longer conceived of as ... the 
greatest of all spiritual things [but rather as] the origin of all things [that is] the 
Supreme Reality."21 But it is quite possible to delight in an adherence to 
morality conceived of as a natural law or an ontological underpinning which is 
not innate in Man. The injunction "one ought to strive to be a gentleman" 
might not be innate in the consciousness of Man but rather have the status of 
an objective or law, in the sense that such obligations are ontologically 
primitive realities. Yet it may be the case that Man delights in the fact that 
the injunction has this status, in the fact that one follows it, or in the fact that 
one learns to follow or be conscious of it. Even if one conceived of the Way as a 
moral law that is "Heaven-sent" in a spiritual, metaphysical, or anthropomor- 
phic Way, it is quite consistent to claim both that the law can be a source of 
delight and that it is not innate in Man. For one thing, one could consistently 
hold that what is sent to or even what is innate in Man is the knowledge that He 
must follow the Way if He is to overcome his innate immorality or amorality.22 
Finally, the claim that every natural activity that is pursued unimpeded is 
usually delightful or joyous is dubious, even if it is intended as a piece of factual 
psychology. Suitable counterexamples include growing one's hair without ever 
cutting it, eating potatoes raw rather than cooked, evacuating one's bowels, 
dying of cancer, and bleeding from one's wounds. Nor is every usually delight- 
ful or joyous activity one that is natural or unimpeded. Suitable counterexam- 
ples include the wearing of clothes and the use of cosmetics. 
B. Textual Evidence that Apparently Supports the Orthodox View 
As is well known, the strongest textual evidence for the claim that Confucius 
held that virtue is innate is found in seven passages in the Analects, namely, 4:5, 
164 Williams 
4:8, 7:22, 7:29, 8:7, 15:8, and, famously, 6:17. I will show that the support that 
these passages give to the orthodox view of Confucius' beliefs is an illusion. 
Indeed, close examination reveals two of these passages, namely, 8:7 and 15:8, 
to be evidence against the orthodox claim. I shall deal with each of the six 
passages in turn: 
4:5. "... A superior man never abandons humanity even for the lapse of a 
single meal. In moments of haste, he acts according to it. In times of difficulty or 
confusion, he acts according to it."23 
This claim is entirely consistent with the view that a superior man is one who 
has learned to practice jen, or who has learned to overcome his innately evil 
nature, and that he thus practices, and thus overcomes, consistently through- 
out his life. 
4:8. Confucius said, "In the morning, hear the Way; in the evening, die 
content!"24 
One way of taking this is as the hypothetical claim that if one hears the Way 
then one can die morally satisfied. But this claim might still be true even if the 
Way is not innate in Man, that is, if one has to learn to hear the Way. One might 
consistently satisfy the moral demand of "willingly sacrificing one's life for the 
Way" by satisfying the moral demand that one acquires the Way in order to 
sacrifice oneself to it, in the same manner as some believers who have to acquire 
a religious faith in order to become martyrs. 
Moreover, Waley tells us25 to read 4:8 in the same spirit as "Vedi Napoli e 
poi mori." Read this way, the passage is clearly inconclusive. It is absurd to 
suppose that the sight of Naples could be innate. 
7:22. Confucius said, "Heaven produced the virtue that is in me; what can 
Huan T'ui do to me?"26 
To be fair to the orthodox view of Confucius' beliefs, the claim that "Heaven 
produced the virtue that is in me" (my emphasis) does not, surprisingly, entail 
that virtue is not innate in me. It would be naive to claim that whatever is 
produced in X is non-innate in X. Heavenly production of virtue would be 
consistent with its innateness, given that Confucius conceives of Heaven as 
some organic or teleological force or principle, and that there is no contradic- 
tion in the view that some "organically produced" effects are innate to the 
organism in question. For example, it might be argued that ova are produced by 
the body of an adult woman, but are innate in the sense that the organic pro- 
cess which begins at birth and which realizes its goal in adolescence is innate at 
birth in a child that is to be a woman. But the fact that this particular sense 
of heavenly production is consistent with the innateness of morality does not 
establish that it is implied by it. It is also consistent with the non-innateness of 
morality. For example, the ova of a woman who has had them surgically 
implanted are not innate in her, but then neither are the ova of a woman who 
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has undergone surgery as a child to stimulate artificially the production of 
hormones which eventually terminate their production at adolescence. In 
order for the "fruits of production" in this sense to be innate, the producing 
mechanism must also be innate. Even if the producing mechanism is innate, its 
products are not innate if they are not produced. Ova are not innate in a woman 
who has innate hormones that work towards their production if she accidental- 
ly becomes sterile before adolescence. In the light of these points, it seems 
more plausible to suppose that if consistent, Confucius' view is that the virtue- 
producing mechanism is innate in Man, or even that this is Heaven. But to 
claim that the ability to be virtuous is innate does not entail that virtue itself is 
innate. 
7:29. Confucius said, "Is humanity far away? As soon as I want it, there it is 
right by me."27 (In Waley: "As soon as I want it, there it is at hand."28) 
But this claim is consistent with the claim that virtue is not innate. It is 
consistent to say both that humanity is innately amoral or immoral, but always 
accessible to Man, and that since it is accessible to change, from an innately 
non-moral to a non-innately moral state, this changed state of humanity as 
moral is likewise accessible. A rich man who has acquired wealth has wealth 
right by him as soon as he wants it, but not even those who have inherited 
fortunes are innately wealthy. 
8:7. Tseng Tzu said, "An officer must be great and strong. His burden is 
heavy and his course is long. He has taken humanity to be his own burden-is 
that not heavy? Only with death does his course stop-is that not long?"29 
But even if it had been established that Tseng Tzu accurately represented 
Confucius' view, then it entails that Man is not innately virtuous, and that Man 
is not naturally virtuous but has to struggle to make himself so. It is difficult to 
see how morality could be a burden, even in our dealings with others, if we are 
all naturally moral-especially given Lau's view that "delight and joy are 
usually experienced when a man pursues a natural activity unimpeded." 30 
15 :8. Confucius said, "A resolute scholar and a man of humanity will never 
seek to live at the expense of injuring humanity. He would rather sacrifice his 
life in order to realize humanity."31 (My emphasis) 
First, this does not entail that virtue is innate. A man who has learned to be 
virtuous and who struggles against reverting to his innately evil ways may never 
seek to live at the expense of injuring humanity, either in the sense of transgres- 
sing against other men or in the sense of allowing his manhood to remain in its 
original degraded state. Second, the fact that men have to do certain things in 
order to realize humanity or virtue is often indicative of their lack of humanity 
or virtue. Moreover, if we further accept the view, a la Lau, that only what is 
done easily or in an unimpeded manner is done naturally, then since men 
do not do these things (for example, sacrificing one's life, or carrying a heavy 
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burden down a long road) easily, they do not do them naturally. Therefore men 
naturally lack humanity and virtue. The same point is even more clearly sup- 
ported by an earlier passage in the Analects, "The Master said, Goodness 
cannot be obtained till what is difficult has been duly done"32 (my emphasis). 
C. Passage 6:17 
As others have pointed out,33 the strongest textual evidence for the claim that 
Confucius held that goodness is innate in Man is 6:17 in the Analects. Hwang 
claims that there are at least three ways of translating the passage into 
English.34 My claim is stronger. In fact there are at least four translations, and 
even when we have arrived at the English version, with a corresponding in- 
crease in clarity,35 such version or versions are still ambiguous. The Waley 
translation reads: 
Man's very life is honesty, in that without it he will be very lucky indeed if he 
escapes with his life.36 
This might well mean that honesty is a practical necessity if one is to survive 
without the intervention of luck, a view shared by Hobbes37 and the Chinese 
Legalists. But neither of the latter believed that Man is innately virtuous. 
Again, it might mean that honesty is a logical necessity if one is to live without 
the luck of never having to choose between honesty and dishonesty and yet 
have one's integrity or soul survive. But since this view is a tautology, and since 
the claim that Man is innately moral is at best a contingent truth, the latter 
cannot be identical with, nor entail, the former, since no tautology can be 
contingent, nor can any tautology entail any contingent proposition, as was 
famously demonstrated by Lewy.38 
The Chan translation reads: 
Confucius said, "Man is born with uprightness. If one loses it he will be lucky if 
he escapes with his life."39 
But, as Chan himself admits, "Confucius' own position as to whether human 
nature is originally good is not clear."40 A plausible clarification of this English 
version of 7:18 is that the fact of being born at all is a morally upright thing or 
that the fact of being born a Man, rather than an animal or insect, is a morally 
good thing. It might even mean that it is a good thing to be born as a Man, 
rather than unborn as a spirit. Confucius certainly appeared to believe in this 
latter possibility, for it is said that "He sacrificed to the dead, as if they were 
present. He sacrificed to the spirits, as if the spirits were present."41 It goes 
without saying that neither of these views entail that moral goodness is innate 
either in Man or in men. A further interpretation is that Man is, at the time of 
his embarkation upon life, either in possession of the prudential strength to 
stand upright both in a literal and in an extended but still prudential sense, or is 
faced with the necessity to gain that strength in order to gain the title of a 
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"real man." Neither view entails that virtue is innate. The translation that 
Legge prefers is that 
The Master said, 'Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, 
and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune.'42 (My 
emphasis) 
This, he claims,43 is preferable to the phrase (used by Chan) "born with upright- 
ness." But there is a clear sense in which saying that A is born for X-ness in no 
way commits one to a view that X-ness is innate to A. One sense is that it is 
appropriate for A to achieve X-ness. Thus if we say that Prince William, son of 
Prince Charles of England, is bornfor sovereignty, we do not imply the absurd 
thesis that sovereignty is innate in him, but simply that it would be appropriate 
with who he is, were he to become King of England. A related but different 
sense is that in order to be worthy of the title "Man," "a real Man," or "Gentle- 
man" one has to be born to uprightness in the sense of being born into a family 
of real men or gentlemen. In other words, a necessary condition of achieving 
the social status desired is that one is born to a family of similar social status. 
This is in fact what one means by saying that a member of the landed gentry 
must be born to the gentry, or that to be a true or successful farmer, one must 
be born to the soil. Neither of these senses of being born either for or to 
uprightness implies that one is born innately morally upright. 
Finally, it is important to note that even if this translation proves that honesty 
is held to be innate, it does not thereby prove that virtue is held to be innate, 
since honesty is only one of the virtues. We do not judge that Hitler was evil 
simply because he was dishonest. Conversely, Ebenezer Scrooge was totally 
honest about his moral failings, notably his lack of charity and paucity of spirit. 
V. NEW TEXTUAL EVIDENCE 
A. Textual Evidence Against the Orthodox View 
I will now present further and independent evidence that Confucius held that 
morality is not innate in Man. 
The first mention of human nature in the Analects, namely, 
Tzu-kung said, Our Master's views concerning culture and the outward insignia 
of goodness, we are permitted to hear; but about Man's nature and the ways of 
Heaven he will not tell us anything at all44 (My emphasis) 
puts defenders of the traditional interpretation into an embarrassing and logi- 
cally inescapable dilemma. Either this report of Confucius' views is correct, in 
which case Confucius did not express any views about human nature and a 
fortiori did not express the view that human nature is innately good, or this 
report of Confucius' views is incorrect, which casts serious doubt upon the 
reliability of the whole enterprise of reading the Analects in order to determine 
what Confucius' views were. This is an especially important possibility to note, 
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since many of the passages in the Analects are second-order reports of the form 
"A said that B said that p." 
Finally I present a new textual argument that either Confucius' views are 
self-contradictory or they include the view that morality is not innate in Man. 
First, 7:19 reads: 
"The Master said, I for my part am not one of those who have innate knowl- 
edge...." 45 (My emphasis) 
And if Confucius did not have innate knowledge, then he did not have innate 
knowledge of right and wrong, and it follows that Man, as opposed to men, 
does not have such innate moral knowledge. 
Second, Confucius clearly did not think that all men are good. For example, 
8.3 reads: 
The Master said, 'Impetuous, but tricky, ingenuous, but dishonest! Simple- 
minded, but capable of breaking promises! To such men I can give no 
recognition.' 46 
Using "V" to stand for the predicate "is virtuous" we can symbolize this as 
9. 3x -Vx. 
But it follows from this that either not all men have the inborn qualities one 
would think important for virtue, or that these qualities are not sufficient for 
virtue. In other words, 
10. - x Qx v - x (Qx = Vx). 
Thus it is false to say either that Man as a whole has these innate qualities or 
that those innate qualities produce virtue in Man. 
We are now faced with three mutually exclusive alternatives. Either Con- 
fucius believed that virtue is not innate in Man, and no more, or he also 
believed that virtue is innate in Man, in which case the views of the Analects are 
internally inconsistent, or, finally, the views discussed so far are not those of 
Confucius, and hence the Analects are an unreliable guide to what Confucius 
believed. It should be obvious that any alternative is fatal to the traditional 
argument that Mencius was a true successor of Confucius. There is, moreover, 
independent evidence for the second and third approaches. 
First, there are other obvious contradictions in the Analects. For example, in 
14:7 we find the claim: 
It is possible to be a true gentleman and yet lack Goodness,47 
whereas in 4:5 the claim is that 
"The Gentleman who ever parts company with Goodness does not fulfill that 
name. Never for a moment does a gentleman quit the way of Goodness."48 
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Moreover, there is a contradiction in the discussion of the putative virtue- 
producing qualities. In 12:8, we get this passage: 
Chi Tzu-ch'eng said, A gentleman is a gentleman in virtue of the stuff he is 
made of. Nature cannot make gentleman. Tzu-kung said, I am sorry, Sir, that 
you should have said that... nature is just as important as inborn qualities; and 
inborn qualities, no less important than culture.49 
Clearly this view is that certain inborn qualities and culture are both necessary 
conditions of a Gentleman. Using "G," "Q," and "C" to stand for the pre- 
dicates "is a gentleman," "has virtue-producing inborn qualities," and "is 
cultured," this can be symbolized as 
11. x(Gx v (Qx & Cx)) 
But Confucius also seems to believe that certain men are both virtuous and 
uncultured. For example, part of 17:23 reads: 
"The Master said,... If a gentleman has courage but neglects Right, he becomes 
turbulent. If a small man has courage and neglects Right, he becomes a 
thief." 50 (My emphasis) 
It is clear from the context of this passage that Confucius' "small man" is not a 
Gentleman, and there could be no point in talking of neglecting Right, unless 
such men at least can sometimes follow Right. Indeed one can only neglect 
one's duties if the possibility exists of following them. In fact this is born out by 
another passage, 4:7, where Confucius is reported as saying 
Every man's faults belong to a set [of qualities which include virtues].51 If one looks out for faults it is only as a means of recognizing Goodness.52 
In effect we now have the claim: 
12. 3x(Vx & - Cx) 
Finally there is 14:7, namely: 
"... there has never yet existed a good man, who was not a gentleman."53 
In other words: 
13. x(Vx D Gx). 
Yet the conjunction of these three claims, that is, (11), (12), and (13), is 
internally inconsistent.54 
Given that Confucius' views are internally inconsistent, we can say that his 
views imply that Man is not innately virtuous, since any conclusion follows from 
an inconsistent set of assertions. It might, of course, be replied that this is an 
overly technical sense of "follows," but in an intuitively acceptable sense of 
"follows," nothing really follows from an inconsistent set of claims, and indeed 
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the two senses of "follows" are less far apart than they appear to be, since a 
license to say everything in general is no license to say anything in particular. 
And the consequence of this is that no view, including the view that virtue is 
innate in Man, can be inferred from the claims of Confucius until an argued 
decision has been made for a rejection of one or other of the claims, in order to 
resolve the inconsistency. What decision should be made, and upon what basis, 
are questions that fall beyond the scope of this article. 
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